KMT Chairman Chiang’s Keynote Speech at the 19th US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

October 5, 2020

Chairman Splinter, President Hammond-Chambers, distinguished guests from around the world: good morning, good afternoon, and good evening! A big thanks to the US-Taiwan Business Council for holding this event. I am greatly honored to give a keynote speech at this 19th US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference. I will take this opportunity to elaborate on my perspective of the Republic of China (ROC) national defense policies for you. Ever since the first US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference was held in 2002, many people from all walks of life have recognized its importance, and I was very happy to visit the US and attend last year in the capacity of KMT legislator. Although this year's conference, due to the coronavirus pandemic, is online, I am convinced that, through communication and dialogue, our conference will still produce abundant value.

To that end, I will now share my views on the KMT's analysis of the present situations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, as well as the challenges that the ROC faces in developing our military combat readiness and developing an elite and agile ROC Armed Forces.

As the adversity between mainland China and the US intensifies, the global trend seems to be of a return to a Cold War geopolitical framework. Furthermore, these two sides have recently begun conducting military operations with increasing daily frequency in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait areas. The risk of conflict continues to rise.

Regarding the complex situation in the South China Sea, the KMT calls upon all relevant parties to exercise self-control, and to consider bringing the ROC in for formal consultation. Otherwise, the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea will become even more difficult to resolve.

The position of the KMT is: based on history, geography, and international law, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Shisha (Paracel) Islands, Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), Tungsha (Pratas) Islands, and their surrounding waters, are all inherently ROC territory and territorial waters. According to international maritime law, Taiping Island is defined as a naturally formed island, so it exerts a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the waters surrounding it. The South China Sea arbitration case denies the legal status of Taiping Island; however, as the ROC is not a party to this arbitration case, this result is not legally binding on the ROC.

Regarding the security of the Taiwan Strait, the KMT has long opposed any and all Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military operations that threaten Taiwan, including aircraft and warships crossing the Taiwan Strait median line. This type of behavior not only threatens the security of Taiwan and increases the risk of unintentional cross-Strait conflict, but worse, it destroys the peace and stability of the entire Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. This type of behavior is absolutely unnecessary. I call upon the authorities in Beijing to not employ military force when handling affairs related to Taiwan. Only in this way can we reduce the probability of conflict breaking out. At the same time, the authorities in Beijing should squarely face the existence of the ROC, which has persevered since 1912. Only through peaceful interaction, mutual respect, and seeking common ground while putting aside differences, are we able to progressively accumulate basic cross-Strait mutual trust. Only after we obtain this mutual trust can we lay a solid foundation of cross-Strait interaction.

For the sake of averting a cross-Strait war, as the KMT Chairman, I believe that, in addition to making an attempt at improving cross-Strait political relations, we must also eliminate Beijing's military optimism. I firmly believe that by developing resolute and substantial ROC military capability, we can compel Beijing to cautiously weigh the consequences of employing military force so that it will be less likely to recklessly initiate war. This is also "Peace through Strength."

However, here I also call upon the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government to do the following two things: to abide by the ROC Constitution, and to avert a vicious cross-Strait spiral into conflict by proactively seeking  a basis for cross-Strait political dialogue.

Many people say that the US is just using Taiwan as a pawn in its Indo-Pacific strategy, or as negotiating leverage against the Beijing authorities. I sincerely hope this is not the case. The ROC and the US fought side by side in both World Wars. We then prevented communist power from expanding past the first island chain, defending it together. In terms of security in the Taiwan Strait, our relationship should be that of collaborating partners. Furthermore, in addition to continuously supplying necessary weapons systems in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the US should employ diplomatic means to attempt to reduce the motivation for the authorities in Beijing to resolve cross-Strait issues with force. This would also be conducive to the stability and development of the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions.

Looking towards the future, the complex relationship of competition and cooperation between the US and mainland China will persist. However, if both sides of the Taiwan Strait can resume a certain level of mutual trust and dialogue, then both Taiwan-US relations and cross-Strait relations can remain mutually inclusive, and furthermore, the "Close to the US, Peace with the mainland" strategy of the previous KMT government can also be applied in some way.

I still remember that during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, I just so happened to be serving as a frogman at Quemoy (Kinmen), so I know from personal experience the thin line between peace and war. We are not afraid of war, but we cannot bear to see innocents sacrificed for its sake. Therefore, under my leadership, the KMT will spare no effort in making the defense of ROC sovereignty our responsibility, and in making the defense of Taiwan's safety our mission. For the sake of national security and cross-Strait peace, to prevent the reappearance of war, the KMT is willing to serve as the canary in the coalmine. We remind the people of the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait to ensure that they are  alert to the misery of war.

I would like to reiterate that, as long as Beijing refuses to renounce the use of military force against Taiwan, we onTaiwan will always be under military threat, regardless of how cross-Strait relations develop. In accordance with mainstream opinion on Taiwan, the KMT advocates for improvement of cross-Strait relations, while at the same time never underestimating the threat that the strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses for Taiwan. In the past few years, the aggregate power of mainland China has increased rapidly, increasing and diversifying the military threat Taiwan faces. In cross-Strait relations, we must pay close attention to the following two points: first, the continuous increase in capability of the PLA, and second, cybersecurity threats, which are usually invisible.

I also want to note, since June of this year, the PLA's military activities near Taiwan have rapidly increased in terms of frequency and intensity.     

The ROC Armed Forces, as of now, faces numerous major challenges in terms of the threat from the PLA's military strength. I will name just a few of them.

First, our defense budget is limited. Although the ROC’s defense budget totals 367 billion NTD in 2021, only 197 billion NTD will actually be allocated to military strength and preparedness programs. Due to fiscal constraints, it is difficult for our government to increase the defense budget in the short run.

Second, because our military still consumes a large amount of manpower to maintain outdated equipment, the ROC Armed Forces is compelled to waste a large chunk of budget. Thus, new systems are unable to be employed effectively. This causes even more difficulties as the ROC Armed Forces tries to update its Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities.

Third, our reserve forces are not up to snuff, and they lack qualified and specialized officers. If conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait, under the current circumstances of limited early warning and expected range of attack covering the entire island, we will not have sufficient time and sufficient secure space to complete preparations of the majority of our reserves for battle.

Fourth, the militaries on both sides of the Strait lack an accident prevention mechanism. Therefore, there is a high likelihood of an accident, even in peacetime. Unfortunately, because the two militaries lack communication mechanisms and standards for preventing unintentional incidents, not only is the ROC Armed Forces’ war preparation pressure increased, but the opportunity to eliminate the chances of a minor incident escalating into a larger conflict is also impossible. It is even possible that a small incident would result in a major crisis that Taipei, Washington, and Beijing cannot predict nor want to meet.

In order to address the above threats and challenges, I believe that in terms of national defense, the most important goal for the ROC Government consists of developing an elite and agile ROC Armed Forces.

Here are my four points.

First, we must strengthen the capacity of the ROC Armed Forces to counter the CCP's internet and telecommunications warfare. The ROC Armed Forces should continue to not only improve its ability to protect the security of information, but it must also try to advance its ability to engage in cyberwarfare.

Second, we must improve the capabilities of our reserve forces. How will we do this? Number one, we need to increase the number of standing military officers; number two, we need to reduce the number of backup reserve units in order to concentrate resources, thus improving the effectiveness of the reserve force’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. We also need to amend relevant laws to authorize our executive branch to implement advance mobilization under certain unusual circumstances.

Third, we must pursue steady growth of the defense budget. I have always advocated for the maintenance of necessary national defense capabilities to promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In order to achieve this goal, we must rely on a steady, well planned, and cost effective defense budget. Furthermore, the government needs to envision the defense budgeting circumstances over the next ten years and the suitable programs for each and every combat readiness operation. Also, in order to improve the efficiency of national defense expenditures, we should require that the Defense Ministry periodically introduce innovative warfare concepts and practices.

Fourth, we must continue to strengthen military exchange between the ROC and the US. My suggestions are as follows:

1) Expanded bilateral intelligence cooperation. In addition to improving the ROC Armed Forces’ early warning and missile defense capabilities, this can increase our military's grasp of PLA tactics, training, unit assignments, and new equipment.

2) Continued sales of weapons, equipment, and technology. Through these sales, the ROC Armed Forces is able to more easily improve its ability to conduct NCW, beyond visual range (BVR) warfare, joint air defense operations, joint suppression warfare, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other fields of warfare.

3) Relaxation of the rank restrictions on bilateral high-level military and civil official exchange visits.

As everyone here knows, the security challenges we face have never disappeared. We here on Taiwan have experienced several cross-Strait military clashes, and we are now, once again, met with a pivotal time period in both cross-Strait relations and US-PRC relations. For the sake of stable cross-Strait relations and the persistent reinforcement of our self-defense capabilities, we hope to obtain the understanding and support of our US friends, so that together, we can put forth every effort to guarantee peace, stability and prosperity in the region. On behalf of the KMT, I hope that the 19th US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference proceeds productively and successfully, and that I will be able to meet with you all either here on Taiwan or in the US as soon as possible. Thank you very much.

第十九屆美台國防工業會議江主席致詞稿

10/5/2020

史賓林特(Michael R. Splinter)主席、韓儒伯(Rupert Hammond-Chambers)會長及所有與會貴賓，大家早安與晚安！感謝美台商業協會（US-Taiwan Business Council）的邀請，我很榮幸出席第19屆美台國防工業會議（US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference）發表主題演講，並藉此機會向與會的各位貴賓，闡述我對於與中華民國國防政策的觀點。自從2002年舉辦第一屆美台國防工業會議以來，此平台就廣受各界的重視，我很高興去年曾以國民黨立法委員的身份赴美參加此會議，雖然今年的會議因為新冠疫情的影響，改採線上形式進行，但我相信如同以往，透過交流與對話，本屆會議必將會產生豐碩成果。

以下，我將就國民黨對於當前南海與台海形勢的分析、中華民國在建軍備戰上所面臨的挑戰、如何打造一支精銳、靈活的中華民國國軍，分享我的看法。

當前中國大陸與美國間的角力加劇，似乎有重回冷戰架構的趨勢，而且雙方近來在南海地區與台海周邊的軍事行動日益頻繁，衝突的風險正在上升當中。

關於複雜的南海局勢，國民黨應呼籲相關各方自我節制，並考慮將中華民國納入正式協商的一員，否則南海主權問題更難解決。

國民黨主張，根據歷史、地理與國際法而言，東、西、南、中四沙群島及其周遭海域均為中華民國領土及海域。南沙太平島是符合國際海洋法定義的自然形成的島嶼，可以主張200海浬專屬經濟海域；南海仲裁案否定太平島的島嶼地位一節，因我國不是仲裁案當事方，對我國無拘束力。

在台海安全方面，國民黨始終反對中共任何對台灣具有威脅的軍事行動，包括軍機艦越過台海中線。此種行為不但威脅台灣安全、增加兩岸意外衝突的風險，更破壞亞太或印太區域的穩定與和平，完全沒有必要。我呼籲北京當局不要用武力處理對台事務，這樣才能減少衝突發生的機率，同時，北京當局應正視自1912年便存在的中華民國，唯有和平相處、相互尊重、求同存異，才能逐步積累兩岸的基本互信。有了互信，才能厚植兩岸交流的基礎。

為避免兩岸兵戎相見，身為國民黨主席，我認為除了應設法改善兩岸政治關係，也必須讓北京在軍事上無法樂觀。我深信建構中華民國堅實的國防戰力，可讓北京在動武之前必須仔細衡量後果，不致貿然輕啟戰端，這也是「以實力換和平」的一種。  

不過，我也呼籲民進黨政府應該做到下列兩件事：遵守中華民國憲法，同時設法藉由積極找回兩岸對話的政治基礎，避免讓兩岸關係更加陷入惡性衝突螺旋。

有許多人說，美國現在將台灣作為印太區域的棋子或是與北京當局談判的槓桿點，我希望這不是真的。美國和中華民國曾經在第一次和第二次世界大戰中並肩作戰，也曾共同防禦不讓共產勢力超過第一島鏈；就台海安全而言，雙方應是合作夥伴關係，而且美國除了根據《臺灣關係法》(Taiwan Relations Act, TRA)繼續提供台灣需要的武器系統外，更應透過外交溝通，設法降低北京當局以武力解決兩岸問題的動機，因為這也有益於亞太或印太區域的穩定與發展。

展望未來，美國與中國大陸間的複雜競合關係仍會持續，但只要台海兩岸能恢復一定的互信與對話，台美關係與兩岸關係之間可以並行不悖，而且過去國民黨執政時期的「親美和陸」將找到一定的施力點。

我還記得，1996年台海飛彈危機時，我正在金門兩棲部隊服役，親身體會過戰爭和平的一線之間。我們不畏戰，但我們不忍見無辜犧牲，因此我所領導的國民黨會盡最大努力，以維護中華民國主權為己任，以捍衛台灣安全為使命。為了國家安全以及兩岸和平，阻止戰爭的再現，國民黨不怕當示警的烏鴉，將會忠實地揭露台海衝突風險，藉以提高全民憂患意識。

我想再次強調，不管兩岸政治關係如何演變，只要北京當局不放棄武力犯台，對於台灣的武力威脅就始終存在。正如同台灣的主流民意，國民黨主張應設法改善兩岸關係，卻也從未低估中共武力對台灣所造成的威脅。尤其近年中國大陸的綜合國力快速增長，對台灣的軍事威脅也日趨多元，以下兩方面特別值得我方重視，第一是共軍持續提升武力犯台的能力，第二是無形的網路資訊襲擾。

自今年六月以來，共軍在台灣周邊的活動，不僅在頻率與威脅的強度方面，都快速增加。

面對中共的武力威脅，中華民國國軍目前面臨許多重大挑戰，例如以下幾項。

第一是我國國防預算有限，甚至不及十三年前，中華民國 2021年的國防預算雖達3668億新台幣，我國政府所編列與國軍戰力與戰備密切相關的預算，合計僅約1972億台幣，受限於財政限制，國防預算的增長在短期內有其困難。

第二是由於國軍仍耗用大量人力操作效能低落的老舊裝備，此情況耗費大量預算，導致新式裝備的效益無法充分發揮，更為國軍提升「網狀化作戰能力」增添許多困難。

第三則是後備戰力有待提升，由於缺乏足夠數量與專業的軍士官。一旦台海爆發衝突，在預警時間有限與攻擊範圍幾乎涵蓋全島的情況下，我方將無足夠時間與足夠安全的空間，讓多數的後備單位完成戰備。

第四則是兩岸缺乏軍事意外的防止機制，即便是承平時期都可能引發潛在意外。因兩岸軍方沒有防範意外事件發生的溝通機制與行為準則，此情況不僅增加國軍的戰備壓力，也無法降低排除擦槍走火的機會，甚至可能引發台北、華府和北京三方所難以預見與不樂見的危機。

因應以上的威脅與挑戰，我認為在中華民國在國防施政上的最重要目標，在於打造一支精銳、靈活的國軍。

我提出以下四點想法。

一是強化國軍反制中共網路與資訊電子作戰的能力，國軍除應持續提升資訊安全防護能力，也要設法提升國軍的網路與資電作戰能力。

二是提升後備戰力，我們應當如何做？第一是增加常備部隊的軍士官人數；第二是必須減少後備部隊的單位數量，以便集中資源提升後備部隊指管通情(C4ISR)系統的效能，並修改相關法律，授權行政部門在某些特別情況下，得實施提前動員。

三是追求穩定成長的國防預算，我向來主張，維持必要的國防武力有助於台海的和平與穩定，此目標的實現，必須提仰賴穩定、有計畫與符合成本效益的國防預算。此外，政府應掌握未來十年內國防財力的供給情形，妥善規畫各項建軍備戰工作，也應要求國防部務必引進創新的觀念與做法，才能提升國防支出的效率。

四則是必須持續強化中華民國與美國間的軍事交流，我有下列幾項建議：

1.     擴大雙方情報合作，除提升國軍的戰略預警能力和飛彈防禦能力，也能增加國軍對共軍戰術訓練、部隊調遣與新裝備動向之掌握。

2.     透過持續的軍售武器裝備與技術，提升國軍遂行網狀化作戰、視距外作戰、聯合防空作戰、聯合制壓作戰和聯合情監偵等領域的能力。

3.     爭取放寬雙邊高階軍文職官員互訪的層級限制。

各位都知道，中華民國的周邊安全挑戰從未消失過，我們在台灣經歷好幾次兩岸的軍事衝突，現在又遇到了兩岸關係與美中關係的關鍵時期。我們為穩定兩岸關係、持續強化自衛能力的想法，希望可以獲得美國朋友的理解與支持，大家一起為區域和平、穩定與繁榮盡一份心力。我謹代表中國國民黨祝福第19屆美台國防工業會議圓滿成功，而我也希望能盡快在台灣或美國見到各位。非常謝謝大家。